

Resist Malicious Packet Dropping in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks

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
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Outline


- Introduction
- Related Work
- Distributed Probing
- Simulation Results
- Concluding Remarks

Wireless Ad Hoc Networks

- A group of mobile wireless nodes
- No fixed infrastructures
- Dynamic network topology
- Cooperative routing protocols
- Mobile Ad hoc NETWORKS (MANET)



A Wireless LAN



A Wireless Adhoc Network

MANET Routing Protocols

- Dynamic Source Routing (DSR)
- Ad hoc On demand Distance Vector (AODV)
- Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV)
- Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR)

MANET Routing Protocol Vulnerabilities

- No security protection mechanisms
 - No entity authentication
 - No message authentication
- Weak Assumptions
 - Nodes are trustworthy
 - Nodes are cooperative

Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks against MANET

- DoS by exploiting routing vulnerabilities
 - Blackhole, Congestion
 - Invalid routes (loop, network unreachable, etc)
- DoS by injecting/dropping data traffic
 - Clogging (injecting packets)
 - Malicious packet dropping

Malicious Packet Dropping

- Serious DoS attacks
 - many motivations
 - combined with other attack techniques
- Easy to launch
 - compromise nodes, join a network
- Difficult to detect
 - passive
 - No detection mechanism in protocol stacks
 - link layer, network layer, transport layer

Related Work

Secure Routing Protocols

- Asymmetric cryptographic primitives
 - Digital signatures
- Symmetric Cryptographic primitives
 - One-time digital signatures
 - One-way hash chains
 - Authentication trees
 - ...

Defeat Clogging

- Quality of Service (QoS)
- IP traceback / Pi (Path identification)
- Egress/Ingress filtering


Detect and mitigate packet dropping

- Perlman proposed a hop-by-hop ACK in 1988 [PER88]
- Cheung proposed a neighborhood probing for wireline network in 1997 [CHE97]
- Bradley proposed a distributed monitoring approach for wireline network in 1998 [BRA98]
- Marti, et al proposed a neighborhood overhearing for MANETs in 2000 [MAR00]
- Padmanabhan and Simon proposed secure traceroute in 2002 [PAD02].

Distributed Probing

Distributed Probing Scheme

- Every node monitor the forwarding behavior of every other node by probing
- An Example
 - Suppose node A wants to know if B forwards A's packets to C
 - A sends a probe message to C through B
 - If A receives an ACK from C, it knows that B is good
 - Otherwise, it is possible that B is bad




Assumptions

- Probe messages are indistinguishable from data packets
 - IP layer security (IPsec ESP)
 - adversaries have limited capability (e.g., dropping packets by manipulating routing tables)
- Multi-hop source routing protocols (e.g., DSR)
- Bi-directional communication links (e.g., IEEE 802.11)

Dynamic Source Routing (DSR)

- Route discovery & Route maintenance
- On-demand/source routing
- Routing cache (path/link)

B	A→B
C	A→B→C
D	A→B→C→D
D	A→B→C→E→D
E	A→B→C→E
E	A→B→C→D→E




Distributed Probing

- Design Questions
- Probe path selection algorithm
- Distributed probing algorithm
- Node diagnosis algorithm
- Avoid detected BAD nodes in path selection

Design Questions

- Which nodes to probe
 - All nodes / a subset of nodes
- Which path to probe over
 - Shortest / longest / any path
- How to probe over a path
 - From nearest to furthest
 - From furthest to nearest
 - Binary search, etc
- When to probe
 - periodically / on demand

Probe Path Selection



Probe Path Selection

- Notations
 - U_{pp} is a set of paths
 - A path, p , is a set of nodes with order
 - The length of p is the number of hops, $|p|$
 - For $0 \leq i \leq |p|$, $p[i]$ is the i^{th} node in the path
- Examples
 - $p_1 = \{A, B, C, D\}$, $p_2 = \{A, C, B, D\}$, then $p_1 \neq p_2$
 - $|p_1| = 3$
 - $p_1[3] = D$, $p_1[2] = C$, $p_1[1] = B$, $p_1[0] = A$
 - $p_1[|p_1|] = D$, $p_1[|p_1|-1] = C$, ...

Probe Path Selection


- Rule #1
 - $\forall p_i, p_j \in \mathbf{U}_{pp}, p_i \not\subset p_j$
 - $p_1 = \{A, B, C\}, p_2 = \{A, B, C, D\}$, remove p_1
- Rule #2
 - $\forall p_i, p_j \in \mathbf{U}_{pp}, p_i[|p_i|-1] \not\subset p_j - |p_j|$
 - $p_1 = \{A, B, C\}, p_2 = \{A, B, D, E\}$, remove C from p_1
- Rule #3
 - $\forall p_i \in \mathbf{U}_{pp}, |p_i| > 1$

Distributed Probing Algorithm

- Probe a path from the furthest node to the nearest
- $\forall p \in \mathbf{U}_{pp}$, probe $p[|p|]$
- If an ACK is received, $\forall v \in p$ and $v \neq p[|p|]$, v is *Good*
- Otherwise, probe $p[|p|-1]$.
- If an ACK is not received from $p[i+1]$ ($0 \leq i < |p|$) but received from $p[i]$, diagnose $p[i]$

Distributed Probing Algorithm

- Simple idea
- The implementation is little bit complex
 - ACK may be lost
 - Retransmission of probing messages (k out of n)



Node Diagnosis Algorithm

- If $p[i]$ is responsive, but $p[i+1]$ is not. Three possibilities:
 - $p[i]$ is *Bad*
 - $p[i+1]$ is *Down*
 - the link $p[i] \rightarrow p[i+1]$ is broken
- Search next shortest path, p_a , to $p[i+1]$ without going through $p[i]$
- if $p[i+1]$ is responsive, probe $p[i]$ over $p_a \rightarrow p[i+1] \rightarrow p[i]$. If $p[i]$ is responsive, $p[i]$ is *Bad*. Otherwise, $p[i] \rightarrow p[i+1]$ is broken for other reasons.

Simulation Results


Simulation Environment

- NS-2 v2.1b9a with CMU wireless extensions
- DSR with path routing caches
- 670m x 670m, 50 mobile nodes
- random waypoint mobility model
- maximum speed 20m/s
- pause time: 0, 50, 100 seconds
- Comm pattern: 10 connects, 4 packets/s
- # of bad nodes: 0, 3, 5, 8, 10, 13, 15


Metrics

- Detection rate
 - # of detected BAD nodes / # of actual BAD nodes
- False positive rate
 - # of GOOD nodes mistakenly detected as BAD / # of GOOD nodes
- Packet delivery rate
 - # of data packets received / # of data packets sent in application layer
- Network overhead
 - # of routing related packet transmissions (including probe messages) / # of packet transmissions


Detection Rate (50-Second pause time)




False Positive Rate (50-Second pause time)



Network Throughput (50-Second pause time)



Overhead (50-Second pause time)



Concluding Remarks

Concluding Remarks

- Incremental deployment
 - Independent from existing routing protocols
- Overhead Reduction
 - piggyback data packets
- Detection Rate Improvement
 - combined with overhearing

References

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[CHE97] S. Cheung and K. Levitt. "Protecting routing infrastructure from denial of service using cooperative intrusion detection". In *Proceedings of New Security Paradigms Workshop*, Cumbria, UK, September 1997.

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[PER88] R. Perlman. "Network Layer Protocols with Byzantine Robustness". *PhD thesis*, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, August 1998.

Thanks!